





Does education matter or is it just a consumption
good like other goods? There is a large consensus
among economists that education is an important
productive input into the wealth of a nation. For
years, people have consistently shown that education
enhances individual productivity, which shows up in
higher wages by 5 to 10 percent per extra year of
education.1 And, when one tries to explain why some
countries are richer than others, the rate of sec-
ondary enrolment comes out as one of the most
robust determinants.2 Education is an investment: by
increasing the total labour input that individuals
supply to the market, it boosts GDP per capita and
living standards. Furthermore, it is also widely con-
sidered that an educated workforce is a valuable
asset at times of rapid technological change, because
educated workers are better at adopting new tech-
nologies.3
Another aspect of education is that it affects the dis-
tribution of income. When the supply of educated
workers goes up, to restore equilibrium in the labour
market, their wage must fall relative to uneducated
workers. As the latter tend to earn less, that reduces
wage inequality. Lower inequality may in turn be
valuable because it reduces social conflict, that is, vot-
ers have lower incentives to support costly redistribu-
tive policies,4 and individuals have lower incentives to
engage in crime and social unrest. 
In most European countries, the public sector holds
a quasi-monopoly on the provision of education. In
most countries, the share of private expenditures in
total educational spending does not exceed 10 per-
cent. It is not totally clear why this should be so, but
at least there are good arguments that justify public
intervention in the educational sector. First, parents
may not make the right educational decisions for
their children, especially if they come from disad-
vantaged backgrounds that are poorly informed
about the costs and benefits of alternative options.
Second, education is more valuable for an individual
if he or she interacts with individuals who are them-
selves educated. For example, an elaborate vocabu-
lary is only useful if one talks to people who can
understand that vocabulary. By acquiring education,
individuals increase the value of education for oth-
ers, but they are not remunerated for that positive
effect (hence called an externality by economists).
Thus, individuals may spontaneously acquire too lit-
tle education. 
One key question is whether direct provision is an
adequate form of government intervention, or
whether one could promote a more decentralised
approach that would contain costs and allow for
greater diversity of individual choices. Historically,
public education has not been put in place to tack-
le the market failures just discussed, but rather to
attain political goals. For example, the public edu-
cation system in France was established in the con-
text of a struggle of influence between the Church
and the State. And educational curricula played an
important role in promoting French national iden-
tity and the French language, for example prepar-
ing for ‘revenge’for the loss of Alsace and Lorraine
in 1870.
If government involvement in education is now
viewed as an economic intervention rather than
shaping the citizenship’s beliefs for political reasons,
one may well reconsider the working of the public
education system. Direct provision of public educa-
tion transforms decisions into collective decisions
that, arguably, might better be left at the individual
level, such as: what should children learn, how fast,
where, and with which techniques? Furthermore,
such provision often eliminates useful competitive
mechanisms that help contain costs and correct
errors. For example, in a public education system, it
is difficult for voters and tax-payers to evaluate the
system’s efficiency. A deterioration of outcomes can
1 See, for example, Psacharopoulos (2003).
2 See Barro and Lee (1994).
3 See Benhabib and Spiegel (2002).
4 See Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993).always be blamed on resources being insufficient
rather than misallocated.
This chapter discusses these issues. It starts by provid-
ing a panorama of Europe’s educational achieve-
ments in light of the recent OECD PISA study. The
chapter then discusses the cost of education and casts
doubts on the usefulness of often-advocated costly
policies, such as reductions in class size. The final part
reviews evidence suggesting that competition between
schools and parental choice bring economic benefits,
especially if institutions such as central exams allow
for transparent choice.
2. How do European countries perform?
Before starting the discussion, it is interesting to
point out that there now exist measures of student
achievement that are comparable across countries,
in particular the OECD-sponsored PISA (Prog-
ramme for International Student Assessment) study.
This is an internationally standardised assessment
that has been jointly developed by participating
countries and administered to 15-year-olds in
schools. The survey is repeated every three years. It
was implemented in the first assessment in 2000 and
in the second assessment in 2003. Tests are typically
administered to between 4,500 and 10,000 students
in each country. 
How do European countries fare
in that comparison? Table 4.1
summarises the average math
proficiency of European stu-
dents, comparing them with the
other countries participating in
that study. It is not obvious how
to interpret these scores. To make
them more transparent, the
OECD has made six groupings,
from level 1 to 6. The median
level, level 3, ranges from 483 to
544 points: because of averaging,
most countries fall into that
interval. The corresponding com-
petences are described as follows:
“ At level 3, students can execute
clearly described procedures, in-
cluding those that require sequen-
tial decisions. They can select and
apply simple problem-solving strategies. Students at
this level can interpret and use representations based on
different information sources and reason directly from
them.”5
In some countries, the average student is near the top
of that level or even at level 4, which is defined as
follows:
“ At level 4, students can work effectively with explicit
models for complex concrete situations that may involve
constraints or call for making assumptions. They can
select and integrate different representations, including
symbolic ones, linking them directly to aspects of real-
world situations. (…) They can construct and commu-
nicate explanations and arguments based on their inter-
pretations, arguments, and actions.”
Conversely, in 11 countries the average student falls
short of level 3, and in a number of them he virtually
is on the border between level 3 and level 2, which
involves the following skills:
“ At level 2, students can interpret and recognise situa-
tions in contexts that require no more than direct infer-
ence. They can extract relevant information from a sin-
gle source and make use of a single representational
mode. Students at this level can employ basic algo-
rithms, formulae, procedures or conventions. They are
EEAG Report 90
Chapter 4
Table 4.1  





Hong Kong 550  4  Slovak Republic 498  3 
Finland 544  3/4  Norway  495  3 
Korea 542  3  Luxembourg 493  3 
Netherlands 538  3  Hungary 490  3 
Liechtenstein 536 3  Poland  490 3 
Japan 534  3  Spain  485  3 
Canada 532  3  United  States 483  2/3 
Belgium 529  3  Latvia 483  2/3 
Switzerland 527  3  Russia  468  2 
Macao 527  3  Italy  466  2 
Australia 524  3  Portugal 466  2 
New Zealand  523  3  Greece  445  2 
Czech Republic 516  3  Serbia 437  2 
Iceland 515  3  Turkey  423  2 
Denmark 514  3  Uruguay  422  2 
France 511  3  Thailand 417  1 
Sweden 509  3  Mexico  385  1 
Austria 506  3  Indonesia 360  1 
Germany 503  3  Tunisia  359  1 
Ireland 503  3  Brazil 356  1 
Source: OECD (2004a), Table 2.5c, p. 356.
5 Source: OECD (2004a), Figure 2.2, p. 47.EEAG Report 91
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capable of direct reasoning and making literal interpre-
tations of the results.”
Table 4.1 suggests a large amount of heterogeneity in
performance. Despite the averaging, four European
countries fall short of level 3: Italy, Portugal, Greece
and Serbia. Latvia and Spain are almost at the fron-
tier between levels 2 and 3. At the other end of the
spectrum, Finland, the Netherlands, and Liechten-
stein come close to reaching level 4.
If we now look at reading proficiency, as reported in
Table 4.2, we see that the ranking and the degree of
heterogeneity between countries is quite similar to
math. Country average performance ranges from
level 1 (337–407 points) to level 3 (481–552), with
level 2 between 408 and 480 score points. Level 3, the
most frequent one, is defined as follows:
“Students proficient at level 3 on the reading literacy
scale are capable of reading tasks of moderate com-
plexity, such as locating multiple pieces of information,
making links between different parts of a text and relat-
ing it to familiar everyday knowledge”.6
On the other hand:
“Students proficient at level 2 are capable of basic read-
ing tasks, such as locating straightforward information,
making low-level inferences of
various types, working out what a
well-defined part of a text means
and using some outside knowledge
to understand it.”
Finally, level 1 is the lowest under-
standing level; literacy problems
start when one is below that level:
“Students proficient at this level
are capable of completing only
the simplest reading tasks devel-
oped for PISA, such as locating a
single piece of information, iden-
tifying the main theme of a text or
making a simple connection with
everyday knowledge”.
The average student is at least at
level 2 in all European countries.
Nevertheless, the breadth of score
levels across countries, in light of
the above definition, can be considered as large as for
math. Another striking fact is that countries which do
well in math also do well in reading, and the laggards
are the same in both fields. The correlation coefficient,
across countries, of the math and the reading scores is
as high as 0.94.
A natural question is: how can we explain such
important differences among European countries in
proficiency levels? That heterogeneity does not seem
to come from genetic differences, nor cultural differ-
ences between people: countries that are quite similar
genetically and/or culturally seem to experience wide
differences in achievement levels. Finland does much
better than neighbouring Sweden, while Norway
does poorly. Furthermore, it is unlikely that countries
that are, for some reason, very “talented” in math
could also be very “talented” in reading. These are
two rather different kinds of skills – as suggested by
the fact that girls are better than boys in reading, but
boys perform better in math. Thus it is unlikely that
“talent”, wherever it comes from, explains these dif-
ferences.
It does not seem that a relationship between GDP per
capita and achievement can explain the difference
between European countries, although it may help
explain why the worst performers – Thailand,
Uruguay, Turkey, Mexico, Indonesia, Tunisia and
Table 4.2 





Finland 543  3  Austria  491  3 
Korea 534  3  Germany  491  3 
Canada 528  3  Latvia 491  3 
Australia 525  3  Czech  Republic 489  3 
Liechtenstein 525  3 Hungary 482  3 
New Zealand  522  3  Spain  481  3 
Ireland 515  3  Luxembourg 479  2 
Sweden 514  3  Portugal 478  2 
Netherlands 513 3  Italy  476  2 
Hong Kong 510  3  Greece  472  2 
Belgium 507  3  Slovak  Republic 469  2 
Norway 500  3  Russia  442  2 
Switzerland 499 3  Turkey  441  2 
Japan 498  3  Uruguay  434  2 
Macao 498  3  Thailand 420  2 
Poland 497  3  Serbia 412  2 
France 496  3  Brazil 403  1 
United States 495  3  Mexico  400  1 
Denmark 492  3  Indonesia  382  1 
Iceland 492  3  Tunisia  375  1 
Source: OECD (2004a), Table 6.2, p. 444.
6 PISA (2003), p. 278.Brazil – are all emerging economies. Among the rich-
est European countries, Liechtenstein ranks 5th in
mathematics, Switzerland 9th, Luxembourg 23rd, and
Norway 22nd. Finally, as we argue below, there is only
a moderate influence of spending per pupil on these
achievement measures.
Thus, the most likely explanation is that differences in
achievements across countries are due to differences in
the way their school system is managed. That impor-
tant conclusion suggests that substantial improve-
ments in schooling achievements can be obtained by
learning from the experience of other countries.
3. The cost of education
Education accounts for a large share of GDP: in
2001, from some 4 percent in Greece to as much as
7 percent in Denmark. That is not specific to Europe:
in the United States, the fraction is as high as 7.3 per-
cent. Thus, from a cross-country comparison perspec-
tive, the cost of education does not seem abnormally
high in Europe. However, in the United States there is
a growing sense of an “education crisis”, based on the
observation that costs are growing, with little impact
on achievement levels that remain mediocre and seem
to deteriorate if one uses standardised tests. We want
to know whether these problems may harm Europe,
too. This section discusses the
basic economics of the cost of
education, the next one asks
whether increased spending is an
efficient investment.
From an economic viewpoint, the
key property of the educational
market is that it is affected by the
so-called  cost disease. The tech-
nology of education has been vir-
tually unchanged in the last thou-
sand years: teachers lecturing in
front of an audience. That makes
education similar to a performing
art like theatre or opera and
stands in contrast to the produc-
tion of industrial goods, where a
single worker, thanks to improve-
ments in technology and machin-
ery, can produce a far larger
quantity of goods than in the
past. It implies that the unit cost of education should
roughly grow like wages, which themselves roughly
grow as GDP per capita. In contrast, for industrial
goods, prices fall relative to wages because of produc-
tivity improvements. Thus education becomes pro-
gressively more expensive relative to industrial goods.
That is more or less borne out by the data: Americans
spent 30 percent of GDP per capita on each student
in 2001, and that figure is exactly the same as in 1991.
Thus, parents have to give up a greater amount of
physical consumption to get the same education level
(in years) for their children. As for the European
Union, that figure is 25 percent, down two points
from 27 percent in 1991.7 In the performing arts, the
cost disease naturally drives consumers away; they
move to substitutes that are not to the same extent
affected by the cost disease, like movies, TV, and
DVDs. In the realm of education, two things may pre-
vent that from happening. First, such substitutes may
not be available, a point to which we return below.
Second, educational expenditures are socialised, so
that parents do not see the cost of their children’s edu-
cation. 
As a consequence of the cost disease, we expect the
share of GDP devoted to education to remain con-
stant as long as the school population remains con-
stant, and it should go up as long as one increases the




The cost disease in economics
The cost disease has been analysed by the American economist William Baumol
from Columbia University. It affects goods like the performing arts where there is no
– or only small – room for productivity improvements. As other sectors of the 
economy see their productivity rising, one hour of labour can produce more goods,
so that the relative price of the performing arts goes up. A simple example is as
follows: assume that one hour of work produces 2 shirts, and that 1000 people can
see a play by 10 actors which lasts 2 hours. These 10 actors could alternatively 
produce 10 x 2 x 2 = 40 shirts, so that each spectator must pay the equivalent of
40/1000 = 0.04 shirts to see the play. Suppose that a new invention raises
productivity tenfold in the textile industry. The actors could now produce 400 shirts.
The textile industry is willing to pay its workers 10 times more than before; to match
it, theatres must increase their price to the equivalent of 400/1000 = 0.4 shirts. The
price of theatre has risen tenfold relative to the price of shirts.
As the economy grows, the performing arts, whose productivity cannot keep up with
other sectors, become ever more expensive in relative terms. If people can find 
substitutes for the performing arts that are not affected by the cost disease, they will 
gradually shift to these alternatives as the economy grows, and the performing arts
will slowly disappear, in the sense that they will employ fewer and fewer workers.
That is what seems indeed to be happening for theatre and opera. But, if that is not
the case, people may actually consume more of them, despite the fact that they cost
more. This is because less can be spent on the goods that become cheaper, so that
more money can be devoted to the goods affected by the cost disease (In technical
terms, it is said that the income effect then dominates the substitution effect). That
seems to hold for goods like health and education, whose expenditure shares go up
as the economy grows. In the case of education, people have been studying longer;
given that the cost per year per pupil has grown in line with GDP, the share of
educational expenditures in GDP has trended upwards.
7 Wasmer et al. (2005).EEAG Report 93
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pledges to bring more people to
upper education, in order to
catch up with more advanced
economies like the US, can only
be met at a substantial cost for
the taxpayer. 
One may well accept that as a
fact and conclude that it is desir-
able for countries to spend a
growing share of their income on
education. But, alternatively, one
may challenge the “cost disease”
view and explore the extent to
which one can increase produc-
tivity in the educational sector.
That brings us into a realm of
controversy: While the rise of
education suggests that costs
could now be cut drastically, many people still recom-
mend policies which precisely go in the other direc-
tion, such as costly reductions in classroom size. We
discuss these policies in the next section.
4. Spending – what does it buy us?
The evidence is clear that an extra year of education
is a productive investment, both at the individual and
economy-wide level. However, many advocate policies
that increase spending given the number of students
and the number of years they spend at school. That
raises the following questions: What is the effect of
increased spending per student? How should a given
amount of spending be allocated between say, class-
room size, teachers’ skills, books, computers, etc.? To
answer that question, we may again use the PISA
study, which reports correlations between, on the one
hand, achievement measures and, on the other hand,
school resources and organisation.
The lesson from this study is that spending indeed
seems to affect performance positively (see OECD
2004a, Figure 2.20, p. 102), but the effect is not very
strong and it only accounts for a small proportion of
the cross-country variation in performance. Further-
more, the effect is probably overstated, because richer
countries spend more, and that simple correlation
may also capture other effects of living standards on
performance (through nutrition, social norms, and so
on). A lot of variation in achievement levels is not due
to spending: the Slovak Republic spends one fourth of
the United States’ expenditure on each student and
yet fares better in mathematics. 
Figure 4.1 plots cumulated spending on education
per student between 6 and 15 years, adjusted for
PPP,8 against the PISA math score.9 There is no
tight connection between spending and perfor-
mance. We can observe a “top league” of efficient
providers, such that no other country performs sub-
stantially better on both proficiency and spending:
these countries are the Slovak Republic, the Czech
Republic, Korea, Finland, and the Netherlands.
Similarly, we can spot clear underperformers: those
countries that seem most remote from the efficiency
frontier, getting the lowest value per dollar spent:
Mexico, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Italy and the
United States(!).
Thus the effect of spending on performance is not
very strong. Can we make more detailed statements?
For example, do specific types of spending, like reduc-
ing classroom size, have a more significant effect of
their own? That is not what the data seem to indicate.
In fact, the raw cross-country correlation between
students per teacher and reading proficiency is posi-
tive: countries with more students per teacher perform
better. The same is true for mathematics (see Figu-
res 4.2 and 4.3). While such raw correlations are
replete with biases and should be taken with caution,
one may think of a number of explanations: low
classroom size may come at the expense of other
Figure 4.1
8 Not adjusting for purchasing power parity is likely to be mislead-
ing. For example, consider a country where wages are lower than
elsewhere, because the cost of a standard basket of goods is lower.
This country would be classified as spending less per pupil than else-
where even though it would hire the same number of teachers per
pupil and grant the same living standards to the teachers. Adjusting
for PPP allows to compute a measure of the true inputs into educa-
tion, rather than just their dollar value.
9 Based on OECD (2004a), Table 2.6, p. 358.kinds of investment, or there may be a trade-off
between quality and quantity of teachers. 
The economics literature has obviously gone beyond
these simple correlations: an abundant literature,
based on US data, has analysed the costs and bene-
fits of alternative educational policies. Hanushek
(2002, Ch. 30) has produced an extensive meta-analy-
sis of that literature, using 376 different studies. He
finds that only a small number of spending items
have a significant effect on student performance. The
pupil-teacher ratio, in particular, has an effect that is
not statistically different from zero in 72 percent of
the studies, while the effect is statistically positive in
14 percent of them and statistically negative in the
remaining 14 percent. Yet costly reductions in that
ratio are constantly advocated as
the path to success. Table 4.3
documents its downward trend
and the associated increase in the
cost of education in the United
States.
The Hanushek meta-study also
suggests that facilities do not have
any noticeable impact on edu-
cational achievement. Teacher
salary and expenditure per pupil
seem to matter a little bit more,
but only marginally: in both cases,
some 75–80 percent of the studies
find negative or insignificant
effects. What seems to matter
most for outcomes is the teacher’s
ranking on an IQ test! 
If teacher quality matters, then it
is not surprising that reducing
classroom size is counterproduc-
tive: reducing classroom size
means appointing more teachers,
which is likely to imply a reduc-
tion in the average quality of
teachers. That suggests that one
should actually pursue the oppo-
site policy: select fewer, but high-
er quality teachers, reward them
accordingly, and increase class-
room size to make sure that all
pupils can access the high quality
teachers. 
The finding that indiscriminate
spending and class size reduction are inefficient is












1960 25.8  2,275 
1970  22.3 3,849 
1980  18.7 5,146 
1990  17.2 6,996 
1995  17.3 7,090 
2000  15.8 8,044 
Source: Hanushek (2002), National Center for Education  
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(2005) on the French experience of ZEP (Zones
d’Education Prioritaire) (see Box 4.2) and by several
recent studies such as, for example, Woessman and
West (2005).
We conclude from this section that there is little
empirical support for the popular view that increased
spending per student, especially in the form of
reduced classroom size, has had a significant effect on
educational quality. That does not imply that it could
not. To quote Hanushek’s words: “The evidence does
not say that money and resources never matter. Nor
does it say that money and resources could not mat-
ter. It simply describes the central patterns of results
given the current organisation and incentives in
schools. Indeed, a plausible interpretation of the evi-
dence is that some schools in fact use resources effec-
tively, but that these schools are counterbalanced by
others that do not. At the same time, the expansion of
resource usage unaccompanied by performance gains
implies a high level of inefficiency in the current oper-
ations of schools.”
5. Meritocracy and selectivity
An issue in defining an educational system is: how
demanding should it be on pupils? How much
should one emphasise the achievements of some
pupils relative to others? How large should dif-
ferences be between “good schools” and “bad
schools” and how selective
should the “good schools” be?
That is, how meritocratic should
the system be?
From an economic perspective, a
number of issues are involved. At
a first level of analysis, one may
just view education as an input in
the production of human capital.
If people were just buying it on
the market, no selection would be
required. Indeed, that is what is
happening in private, continuing
education classes when people
take classes in foreign languages,
driving, computers or math.
Nobody is being turned down,
entry tests are used to determine
which level is appropriate, and
exit tests give the customer a sig-
nal that he may use on the job
market. This suggests that selectivity is the by-product
of the artificial scarcity created by the fact that edu-
cation is free. However, full-curriculum private
schools are often selective, despite often charging high
tuition. That is because education is not only an input
in human capital, but also a signal about one’s intrin-
sic productivity.10 An institution that becomes less
selective allows more people to get education, which
raises their productivity, but at the same time it per-
forms a poorer job at signalling the intrinsic produc-
tivity of its graduates. For that reason it may not
accept applicants even though they might want to pay
the full cost of education.
Another aspect of meritocracy is that it provides
incentives to work hard in order to gain entry into the
good schools. However, note that too much selectivity
may be counter-productive in that respect, as one
does not want to invest too much into winning a con-
test if the probability of winning it is too low. Also,
critics argue that meritocracy is inegalitarian because
it favours students from privileged backgrounds. That
argument may hold only if one believes that the alter-
native would be to put all pupils at the same level by
some coercive means. However, the likely alternative
is that if one reduces academic meritocracy as an
engine of social promotion, it will be replaced by
money and social networks and social mobility will be
even lower.
Box 4.2 
The French ZEP experience 
In 1982, the French ministry of education put in place a programme of increased
support for schools in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, called ZEP (zones d’éduca-
tion prioritaire). The measure was meant to be temporary, but, as is often the case
with costly administrative programmes, is still in force today. Over the years,
different waves of ZEPisation have taken place, so that the fraction of ZEP schools
has increased. Schools in a ZEP zone have greater financial means than schools
outside a ZEP zone. The bulk of this money is used to reduce classroom size, from
a national average of 25 to 23, which increases teaching costs per pupil by 8 per-
cent. Furthermore, teachers who teach in those schools have a higher salary (which
boosts costs by another 4–5 percent) and are promoted more quickly. While most
studies typically have failed to find a significant effect of ZEPs, they often fail to
control for the fact that students in ZEPs are from more disadvantaged back-
grounds. A recent study by Bénabou, Kramarz and Prost (2004) is, however,
immune to that criticism because, using the 1989-90 ZEPisation wave, it looks at
the difference in performance between students in a ZEP school and students in that
same school before if joined a ZEP, and compares it to schools whose status was
unchanged during that wave. They use results at the national Baccalauréat degree as
a measure of performance. Their key finding is that being in a ZEP has essentially a
zero effect on performance. While that confirms the results of Hanushek’s meta-
study, there is some room to believe that they may be due to the negative stigma
associated with ZEP status, with the most motivated parents taking their kids to
private school when their district’s school becomes classified as ZEP. In any case
the presumption holds that the policy has failed, especially given its high cost.
10 See Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1973).The Finnish education system,
discussed in Box 4.3, involves stiff
competition from pupils to get
into the best high schools, while
remaining quite egalitarian in
terms of the resources given to
each student. This may be an
important explanation of why
Finland fares extremely well in
the PISA study in terms of over-
all achievements (see Tables 4.1
and 4.2). Moreover, outcomes are
not more unequal than in other
countries, and socio-economic
background does not matter
more than in other countries.
That experience suggests that
meritocracy is a powerful tool for
boosting educational achieve-
ments, while not generating more
inequality than the feasible alter-
natives.
6. Fighting the cost disease:
school competition and parental
choice
In light of the rising costs of edu-
cation, which is a particularly
salient phenomenon there, the
US has in recent years seen a
heated debate on the problem of
school quality. This has triggered
a wealth of empirical studies as
well as interesting proposals regarding, for example,
school vouchers, greater parental choice between
schools, greater accountability of public schools,
incentive schemes based on academic achievements,
and the like. Even though education in Europe is not
as costly as in the US, we believe it is time to ask the
same question here, rather than wait for costs to
become unbearable. 
The idea behind parental choice is simple: parents
would be free to choose the school which gives the
best results given their children’s needs. Schools that
are successful in attracting pupils would be allowed to
grow accordingly, as their resources would be adjust-
ed upwards. Schools that lose children would experi-
ence a proportional reduction in resources and can
eventually be forced to close. For this system to work,




Main features of the Finnish education system
Figure 4.4 gives an overall picture of the Finnish education system. Municipalities
are responsible for providing and running the basic education and upper secondary
schools.
Basic education is based on comprehensive schools and on the principle of equality. 
Pupils usually attend the local school in the neighbourhood where their family
lives, though there is some movement from neighbourhood schools to other schools
especially between the 6
th and 7
th grades when students move from primary to lower
secondary school. The basic education is mandatory, the curriculum is largely the
same for everybody, and the schools are publicly funded and run.There are a very
small number of private schools, mainly a few foreign schools in Helsinki.
As regards educational achievement in basic education, it has been found that there 
are some differences in learning results between schools, between boys and girls
and between different regions of the country. These differences are, however,
relatively minor. Moreover, it has been found that in Finland the influence of
students’ socio-economic background on learning performance is among the lowest
among countries in the PISA system.
a)
About 55 percent of the students finishing basic education entered the upper
secondary school system and 35 percent the vocational school system (in 1999).
Three percent of students continued an additional, voluntary 10
th grade of basic
education, while seven percent did not continue in the education system in the year
after they finished basic education. Both upper secondary and vocational schools
provide qualification for continuing into tertiary education, which splits into
university and polytechnic education.
Entry to the upper secondary schools is based on the final grades that students
achieve in the basic education system. This has led to significant competition
among students for places in the best upper secondary schools. The competition is
very visible in the bigger cities like Helsinki. The grades required for achieving
entry to one of the best high schools in Helsinki are quite high and the entry
thresholds make news every year. Naturally, the competitive elements have led to
significant differences in the education results among schools, though even at this
stage students’ socio-demographic background is the most important explanatory
factor behind differences in educational attainment in upper secondary schools.
About 65 percent of an age cohort enters the tertiary system and about 43 percent of
the entrants to tertiary education go to the polytechnics. The emphasis on compe-
tition between students continues at the level of entry to the university system. The
universities exercise a system of entry exams and entry can be very difficult,
depending on the subject that a student finishing upper second schooling wants to
study. There is significantly less competition among students for places in the poly-
technics.
a) See Asplund and Leijola (2005) for a summary of these results and references.
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their organisational and peda-
gogical choices. The outcome
would somewhat mimic a market
outcome, but one need not resort
to full-scale privatisation to
achieve it, and one can avoid the
adverse consequences for equal
opportunity and social mobility
of a pure private system.
In most current public systems,
pupils are allocated to a school
depending on their residence, and
schools are run in a centralised
way. On paper, this is supposed
to guarantee maximum equality.
In practice, there is no incentive
for either cost reductions or qual-
ity improvements. In addition,
disadvantaged families suffer
most from inefficient public
schools, as opting out into a pri-
vate school is too costly for them.
Thus they might be the individu-
als who gain most from increased
school competition. Against
these arguments stand the two
traditional ones that (i) parental
choice need not be the best solu-
tion from the child’s perspective
(some parents, for example, may,
place excessive weight on religious instead of academ-
ic content), and (ii) pupils may be sorted into schools
in a segregated and/or inegalitarian way. 
The available amount of evidence on the role of
parental choice and competition is not huge, because
of the scarcity of real world voucher programmes and
similar school competition policies. Furthermore, that
evidence is not always easy to interpret. For example,
a prominent study by Rouse (1998) finds that a
Milwaukee voucher program that allowed a small
number of poor children to attend private schools
was successful in that participants fared better than a
“control group”of non-participants. That tells us that
private schools are “better” than public schools,
which is not very surprising since a “worse” private
school could not survive competition from free public
schools. But it tells us little about what would happen
if the educational system was entirely redesigned to be
based on vouchers.
Angrist et al. (2002) studied a truly random experi-
ment in Colombia, the so-called Programa de
Ampliacion de Cobertura de la Educacion Secunda-
ria, which gave vouchers covering 50 percent of the
cost of private schools to 125,000 students selected by
a lottery mechanism. They found that lottery winners
had better achievements, confirming the view that the
private schools were better. Again it is hardly surpris-
ing that those being allowed to choose between a pri-
vate and a public school achieve better results than if
they are confined to a public school. We expect that to
always be the case unless people grossly misperceive
school performance.11 These studies cannot answer
the key question, which is: does parental choice create
competitive pressure that leads to increased efficiency
or does it only lead to sorting of pupils by skills,
parental background, religious beliefs, income and
other characteristics, with potential adverse effects on
social cohesion and also (to the extent that there are
peer effects) on the overall performance of the school
system? 
Box 4.4 
The Milwaukee Voucher Programme
“Vouchers for poor students in Milwaukee were enacted in 1990 and were first used
in the 1990–91 school year. Currently, a family is eligible for a voucher if its income
is at or below 175 percent of the federal poverty level (at or below 17,463 dollars for
a family of four). For the 1999–00 school year, the voucher amounted to 5,106 dol-
lars per student or the private school’s cost per student, whichever was less. For
every student who leaves the Milwaukee public schools with a voucher, the Mil-
waukee public schools lose state aid equal to half the voucher amount (up to 2,553 dol-
lars per voucher student in 1999–00). Milwaukee’s per pupil spending in 1999–00 was
8,752 dollars per pupil, so the district was losing 29 percent of the per pupil revenue 
associated with a voucher student. Currently, the vouchers may be used at secular
and non-secular private schools” (Hoxby 2004, p. 24).
Using differences between eligibility levels to identify the degree of competition
faced by schools, Hoxby finds that achievement (as measured by test scores)
improved in the schools that faced more competition from private schools relative to
those that faced less competition. Evidence from parental choice programmes in
Michigan and Arizona (Charter schools) points to similar results.
These are important findings suggesting that introducing competition between
schools would improve the efficiency of the educational system. What about
potential adverse effects? Can we fear, for example, that vouchers would lead to
increased segregation, and that the most disadvantaged would suffer because they
would stay in degraded public schools? We do not have a clear answer on that. Epple
and Romano (1998) analyse the impact of vouchers in a theoretical model. They 
predict that introducing vouchers will mostly benefit bright students from poor
families, who would be able to move to private schools that will not charge them a
high price (thus remunerating them for the positive peer effects they create), while
low-ability low-income students would lose, but not by much. However, their
analysis ignores any positive effect of school competition on the efficiency of public
school. If these effects are strong enough, voucher systems could in fact benefit
everybody.
Enhancing parental choice and school competition is not absent from the European
debate either, although many countries maintain an egalitarian, rigid approach to
schooling. In particular, in the UK, the scope for competition and parental choice
was greatly enhanced by the 1988 Education Act. A recent study suggests that this
had positive effects, in that achievement improved substantially in the schools that
were granted more autonomy. However, there is no evidence of competition
improving performance in schools that remained in the traditional, non-autonomous
system.
11 However, the authors also argue that a cost-benefit analysis can be
performed on the basis of their results and that this suggests that
shifting from public provision to vouchers has a positive net social
value.Fortunately, there are studies – a number of them by
Hoxby (2004)12 – that directly document such com-
petitive pressure by looking at the effect of parental
choice programmes on achievement in public schools
– that is in the schools that the choice students are
allowed to leave. For example, the Milwaukee vouch-
er programme (see Box 4.4) was extended in 1998,
covering now 15 percent of school enrolment. That
means that public schools can lose a substantial frac-
tion of their students. Furthermore, the programme is
designed so that these schools also lose resources –
thus public schools have a genuine incentive to im-
prove to retain students. 
Box 4.5 gives basic information and results about the
UK education reform under the Thatcher govern-
ment, which gave more scope for parental choice and
more independence to schools with respect to local
education authorities.
7. Putting the evidence together: designing an 
efficient schooling system
The preceding discussion suggests that school auton-
omy associated with parental choice has positive
effects on the performance of the educational system,
while centralised meritocratic systems also work well.
More systematic cross-country studies based on
PISA-type data can correlate achievement measures
with data on how the system is managed in each coun-
try. These data are summarised in the appendix to this
chapter in Table A4.1, and capture characteristics
such as the degree of school autonomy, the prevalence
of central exams, the importance of private vs. public
financing and management, and so on. They suggest
that the combination of autonomy and meritocracy
works best. Indeed, these studies show that school
autonomy typically works best in countries where a
central nation-wide exam takes place at the end of
high school, while it has insignificant effects in the
absence of a central exam.13
While this type of evidence is not as convincing as
natural experiments, since it ignores the reasons why a
given country has chosen a given system, it makes a
lot of sense. Results at national exams provide a com-
mon metric by which parents can evaluate the perfor-
mance of alternative schools. Furthermore, by design-
ing national exams, governments can set standards for
what schools are supposed to achieve, and (provided
the central exams are properly designed) reduce
parental incentives to put their children into schools
with useless or biased curricula. In principle, however,
one could also envisage a market-based system for
evaluating schools, based on subsequent labour mar-
ket outcomes, as is the case for higher professional
education.
As for the financing of education, things are more
complex. At one extreme, pure public financing
favours equal opportunity, since students can in prin-
ciple access the same educational resources regardless
of their family background. On the other hand, it
gives little incentives to cut costs. At the other
extreme, pure private financing is inegalitarian: there
is indeed evidence that achievements are more likely
to depend on family background, the lower the share
of public financing.14 But it leaves
more room for cost-cutting and
price competition. However, price
competition does not seem to
have managed to bring down the
costs of private schools, in part
because in most countries the
poor, who are the ones who




Education reform in the UK
In 1988 the Thatcher government enacted an Education Act, which substantially
increased the scope for parental choice. The key ingredient of the reform was to
force schools to accept pupils indiscriminately up to some limit, and to tie a 
school’s financial resources to its number of pupils. Thus, it was felt, better schools
will attract more pupils, which would trigger an increase in their resources,
allowing them to grow at the expense of less efficient schools. At the same time,
school autonomy was enhanced by transferring decision making from the district
(Local Education Authorities, LEAs) to the school level. Finally, new schools (so-
called “Grant Maintained” GM) were created. They enjoyed even greater autonomy
and were totally independent of the LEAs. Schools under the supervision of LEAs
could opt out of that system and become grant-maintained. In particular, that
procedure involved parental vote.
Clark (2005) identifies the effects of the reform on educational achievements by
looking at differences in outcomes among schools that decided to opt out of the 
LEA system by a narrow margin, and schools that decided to stay in by a narrow
margin (thus mimicking a random experiment). He finds large positive effects of
the GM status on graduation rates, and shows that these effects are not due to
student selection. On the other hand, contrary to some findings by Hoxby, he does
not find large spill-over effects on schools that remained in the LEA system – they
do not seem to have been ‘disciplined’ by competition from GM schools.
12 In an earlier paper, Hoxby (2000) uses
instrumental variable techniques rather
than natural experiments, reaching similar
conclusions. While there is controversy
about the robustness of these results
(Rothstein 2005), which the authors of the
present report are not able to evaluate, the
2004 paper we refer to uses a number of
different empirical studies to validate the
claim that school competition has a posi-
tive impact on productivity, including the
Milwaukee voucher programme men-
tioned in the text.
13 See Woessmann (2005), Bishop (1997),
and Juerges et al. (2005).
14 See Schuetz et al. (2005).EEAG Report 99
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afford private schools and send their children to pub-
lic schools instead. This suggests that a generous
voucher system, in which a large fraction of costs is
covered by vouchers, might be a good mechanism to
reconcile price competition with equal opportunity.
The PISA study suggests that the organisation of pub-
lic schools has a large impact on achievements.
Furthermore, naïve increases in spending, in particular
in the form of smaller classes, seem to be an inefficient
way of raising achievements. On the other hand, we
have argued that substantial improvements can be
obtained if one fosters competition, both among stu-
dents to get into the good schools and among schools
to attract the good students. The available evidence
suggests that while raising performance, such policies
would not be particularly “unfair” or “inegalitarian”
relative to current practices. Equal opportunity can be
preserved if the financing of education remains public
or if private financing is sustained by vouchers for a
large enough amount. A national central exam will
allow society to make most out of school competition,
by giving parents a clear, uncontroversial way of mea-
suring school quality. 
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